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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the increased emphasis upon safety and health programs in the
workplace, employees sometimes engage in behavior that violates the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (" The Act" ).1 According to the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA), 2 when an employee violates an employer's
safety rule that is designed to implement a government requirement, the employer
is guilty of violating the law.3 Early in the history of the Act, the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (" OSHRC"), along with the courts, recog-
nized that employers cannot be required to guarantee the safe performance of their
employees.4 Accordingly, employers can avoid liability for employee misconduct
under the Act by showing that the violative behavior was "unpreventable" or "un-
foreseeable." 5 A majority of federal appeals courts have held that unforeseeable
employee misconduct is an affirmative defense that an employer must plead and
prove.6
Recently, in L.R. Willson and Sons, Inc. v. OSHRC,7 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals re-affirmed its minority position that, rather than being an af-
firmative defense, the Secretary of Labor ("the Secretary") has the burden of
proving that the employee's misconduct was preventable." The Secretary petitioned
the United States Supreme Court to review the Fourth Circuit's decision. On No-
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994 & Supp. 11998).
2 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration was created under the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, 29 U. S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994 & Supp. I 1998).
3 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ALL ABOUT OSHA 2 (1994).
4 Stephen C. Yohay, Should Past Discipline Be Required To Show Employee Misconduct?
OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS, Mar. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 9953346.
5 See National Realty and Contr. Co., Inc. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Hazardous conduct is not preventable if it is so idiosyncratic and implausible in
motive or means that conscientious experts, familiar with the industry, would not
take it into account in prescribing a safety program. Nor is misconduct prevent-
able if its elimination would require methods of hiring, training, monitoring, or
sanctioning workers which are either so untested or so expensive that safety ex-
perts would substantially concur in thinking the methods infeasible.
Id. at 1266-67 & n.37.
6 Employee Misconduct: DOL Seeks Court Ruling on Burden of Proof For Employee Misconduct,
OSHD (BNA)(August 17, 1998) [hereinafter Employee Misconduct].
7 134 F.3d 1235 (4' Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Herman v. L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc., 119 S.
Ct. 404 (1998).
8 See Ocean Electric Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 396 (4' Cir. 1979). See also Safety and
Health: Fourth Circuit Finds No Privacy Violation In OSHA Inspector's Videotaping of Work Site, 22 DLR
(BNA) A-4 (February 3, 1998).
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vember 2, 1998, this petition was denied by the Supreme Court leaving unresolved
a split among the circuits regarding the issue of who has the burden of proof in
OSHA enforcement proceedings.9
The purpose of this note is to examine the confusing split among the cir-
cuit courts on the issue of who has the burden of proof in OSHA enforcement pro-
ceedings. First, the note provides a background of OSHA and how it functions.
Second, it discusses an employer's defenses to an OSHA citation. Third, the note
addresses the treatment of the employee misconduct defense by the Federal Appel-
late Courts. Fourth, this note considers the implications of L.R Willson and Sons.W
II. THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
A." History
Although historic attempts have been made to improve workplace safety
and health, it was not until 1970 that a uniform and comprehensive provision was
enacted.11 In 1936, Congress enacted the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act,12
which limited working hours, child and convict labor, and set mild standards for
working conditions in factories.13 The Walsh-Healey Act required that contracts
entered into by any agency of the United States for the manufacture or furnishing
of materials in any amount exceeding $10,000 must contain a stipulation that the
working conditions of the contractor's employees were not unsanitary, hazardous,
or dangerous to health and safety. 4 The Walsh-Healey Act, however, had limited
coverage and failed to provide and enforce strict industrial health and safety stan-
dards.'5
By 1970, job safety and health became a serious concern because the num-
ber of employment related accidents and illnesses were exceedingly high.16 In re-
sponse, a bipartisan Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970.' The original intent of Congress was to "attack the problem of workplace
safety by fostering a cooperative effort among employers, the government, and
9 Herman v. L. R. Willson and Sons, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 404 (1998).
1o 134 F.3d 1235 (41 Cir. 1998).
11 MARK A. RoTHsTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW § 3 (4 ed. 1998).
12 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-40 (1936).
13 Id.
14 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 11, § 3.
15 Id
16 See Madjorie Gross, OSHA: Much Ado About Something, 3 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 247,249 (1972).
17 29 U.S.C. § 651-678 (1994 & Supp. 11998).
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labor (worker and work unions)." 8 The Act was intended to provide a means of
identifying causes of work- related illness and injury, and also "to achieve compli-
ance through provision for inspection and penalties."1 9 Since the adoption of the
Act, however, this vision of cooperation "has been replaced by litigation over in-
terpretation of standards and penalty assessments."20
B. The Function of the Act
The Act covers all non-public employers in the United States "engaged in
a business affecting commerce., 21 The Act authorizes the Secretary to promulgate
specific occupational safety and health standards with which all employers covered
by the Act must comply.' The law also obligates employers to provide each em-
ployee with a workplace free from recognized hazards that are likely to cause death
or serious physical injury.23 These provisions are often referred to as the specific
and general duty clauses. Although the Act states that an employee must comply
with all occupational safety and health rules and regulations,24 there is no penalty
for the failure to comply with this duty.25
To enforce employer compliance with the Act, OSHA compliance officers
conduct unannounced inspections to determine if a safe workplace is being pro-
vided to employees. 26 The consequence of a citation can range from a reprimand to
a penalty of up to $70,000 or possibly even imprisonment.27 Once cited, an em-
ployer has the option of contesting the citation or assessed penalty by filing a No-
tice of Contest within fifteen working days from receipt of the citation.28 Thereaf-
18 Joseph R. Demato, Responding to an EEOC Charge or OSHA Investigation, in AVOIDING
WORKPLACE LITIGATION, 1997, at 421, 461 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-
5261, 1997).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1994 & Supp. I 1998). See also Robert E. Rader et al, How to Handle an
OSHA Case: An Employer's Rights and Options, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 493, 494 (1981). "Employers covered
by the Act include but are not limited to workplaces, offices, factories, yards, mills, and construction sites."
Demato, supra note 18, at 461.
22 29 U.S.C. § 654 (a)(2) (1994), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1994 & Supp. 11998).
23 29 U.S.C. § 654 (a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 11998).
24 29 U.S.C. § 654 (b) (1994 & Supp. 1 1998). "Each employee shall comply with occupational
safety and health standards and all rules, regulations, and orders issued pursuant to this chapter which are
applicable to his own actions and conduct." Id.
25 See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 541, 553 ( 3
,d Cir. 1976).
26 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 3, at 16.
27 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)-(e) (1994 & Supp. 11998).
28 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1994 & Supp. 1 1998).
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ter, OSHRC must afford the employer an opportunity for a formal hearing by an
appointed Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ").29 A party aggrieved by the decision
of the ALJ may petition OSHRC for a discretionary review within ten days.'o In
addition, any party that is adversely affected by a final order of OSHRC has sixty
days to appeal to a federal court of appeals.31
C. Types oflnspections
Compliance inspections are conducted without advance notice.32 If an em-
ployer refuses to admit an OSHA compliance officer, or if an employer attempts to
interfere with the inspection, the Act permits appropriate legal action.33 Because
not all workplaces covered by the Act can be immediately inspected, OSHA has
established a system of inspection priorities.34
1. Imminent Danger Inspections
The first priority of OSHA is to inspect workplaces that expose employees
to an imminent danger. An imminent danger is any condition where there is rea-
sonable certainty that a danger exists that can be expected to cause death or serious
physical harms immediately, or before the danger can be eliminated through nor-
mal enforcement procedures.' If an imminent danger is known to exist at a work
site, the Secretary must immediately conduct an inspection.37 In addition, the Sec-
retary has the authority to petition the United States District Court for an order re-
29 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1994 & Supp. 1 1998).
30 Rules of Procedure of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 29 C.F.R. § 2200.
el. seq. (1998).
31 29 U.S.C. § 660 (1994 & Supp. 1 1998). A petition for discretionary review is a prerequisite to an
appeal. Id.
32 .29 U.S.C. § 657 (1994 & Supp. 1 1998).
33 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1994 & Supp. 11998).
34 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 3, at 16.
35 Id. Serious physical harm is any type of harm that could cause permanent or prolonged damage to
the body or which, while not damaging the body on a prolonged basis, could cause such temporary disability
as to required in-patient hospital treatment OSHA considers that "permanent or prolonged damage" has
occurred when, for example, a part of the body is crushed or severed; an arm, leg, or finger is amputated; or
sight in one or both eyes is lost. For a health hazard to be considered imminent danger, there must be a rea-
sonable expectation (1) that toxic substances such as dangerous fumes, dusts or gases are present, and (2) that
exposure to them will cause immediate and irreversible harm to such a degree as to shorten life or cause
reduction in physical or mental efficiency, even though the resulting harm is not immediately apparent. See
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 3, at 17-18.
36 29 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1994 & Supp. 11998).
37 See Rader, supra note 21, at 494 (citing OSHA Field Operations Manual, Chapter IX).
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straining such conditions or practices when necessary.3
2. Catastrophes and Fatal Accidents
Second priority is given to the investigation of fatalities and catastrophes.39
Employers are required to orally report any on-the-job accident that results in the
death of one employee or the hospitalization of three or more employees.' Such
situations must be reported to OSHA by the employer within eight hours.41 Investi-
gations are made to determine if OSHA standards were violated and to avoid the
recurrence of similar accidents.42 OSHA also will inspect accidents which receive
significant publicity, even in the absence of injuries.43
3. Employee Complaints
Next, the Act gives each employee the right to request an OSHA inspec-
tion when the employee feels that he is in imminent danger from a hazard or when
the employee feels that there is a violation of an OSHA standard that threatens
physical harm.44 An employee may file a formal written complaint which specifi-
cally describes the nature of the alleged violation and the location on the em-
ployer's premises where such condition exists. 45 Other types of complaints are con-
sidered non-formal.
4. Programmed High-Hazard Inspections
Finally, OSHA provides programmed or planned inspections which are
aimed at specific high-hazard industries, occupations, or health substances. 46 In-
dustries are selected for inspection on the basis of factors such as death, injury and
illness incident rates, and employee exposure to toxic substances.47 States with their
own occupational safety and health programs may use a different system to identify
38 See id.
39 29 C.F.R. § 1904.8 (1998).
40 Id.
41 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 3, at 19.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 29 U.S.C. § 657(0(1) (1994 & Supp. 11998).
45 29 C.F.R. § 1903.11 (1998).
46 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 3, at 19.
Id.
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high-hazard industries for inspection.48
D. Types of OSHA Citations
After the OSHA compliance officer reports his findings, the area director
determines what, if any, citations will be issued and what penalties will be as-
sessed. The employer will receive citations and notices of assessed penalties by
certified mail.49 For three days, or until the violation is abated,"° the employer must
post a copy of each citation at or near the place where a violation occurred.
1. Willful Violations
A citation for a willful violation is often issued by OSHA when an em-
ployer is considered to have intentionally and knowingly committed a violation."'
Penalties of up to $70,000 may be assessed for each willful violation, with a mini-
mum penalty of $5,000 for each violation.52 An assessed penalty for a willful vio-
lation may be adjusted downward, depending on the size of the business and its
history of previous violations.," If an employer is convicted of a willful violatiofi of
a standard that has resulted in the death of an employee, the offense is punishable
by a court-imposed fine or by imprisonment for up to six months, or both.54
2. Serious Violations
A serious violation citation will be issued by OSHA where there is sub-
stantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result, and that the
employer knew, or should have known, of the hazard.5s A mandatory penalty of up
to $7,000 for each violation is assessed.- A penalty for a serious violation may be
adjusted downward, based upon the employers good faith, history of previous vio-
48 There are currently 25 approved state plans. These states include: Arkansas, Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virgin Islands,
Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 3, at 44.
49 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 3, at 19.
50 Id. at 24.
51 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) & (e) (1994 & Supp. 11998).
52 See id.
53 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 3, at 25.
54 See id.
55 29 U.S.C. § 666(k) (1994 & Supp. 11998).
56 29 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1994 & Supp. 11998).
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lations, the gravity of the alleged violation, and the size of the business.57
3. Violations Determined Not Serious
OSHA may cite an employer for a violation that has a direct relationship to
workplace safety and health, but will most likely not cause death or serious physi-
cal harm.ra An assessed penalty of up to $7,000 for each violation is discretionary. 59
A penalty for an other than serious violation may be adjusted downward by as
much as 80 percent. 60
4. Repeated Violations
An employer who repeatedly violates any standard, regulation, rule, or or-
der where, upon re-inspection, a substantially similar violation is found, may be
subject to a citation for a repeated violation and up to a $70,000 penalty per viola-
tion. 6' To be the basis of a repeated citation, the original citation must be final; a
citation under contest may not serve as the basis for a subsequent repeated
citation.62
5. Failure to Correct Prior Violation
Finally, if OSHA finds that an employer has failed to correct a prior viola-
tion a civil penalty of up to $7,000 for each day the violation continues beyond the
prescribed abatement date may be assessed.63
E. Employer Defenses to Citations
In all OSHA proceedings which are initiated by the filing of a notice of
contest, the Secretary has the burden of proving that a violation exists.64 If a cita-
57 29 U.S.C. § 6660) (1994 & Supp. 1 1998). In determining gravity, consideration is given to the
number of employees exposed, the duration of the exposure, the precautions taken against injury, and the
degree of probability that any injury would occur. J.A. Jones Const. Co., 15 BNA OSHC 2201, 2214,
1991-93 CCH OSHD P 29,964, p. 41,033 (No. 87-2059, 1993); Caterpillar, Inc., 15 BNA OSHC 2153, 2178,
1993 CCH OSHD P 29,962, p. 41,011 (No. 87-922, 1993).
58 29 U.S.C. § 666(c) (1994 & Supp. 11998).
59 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 3, at 25.
See id.
61 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1994 & Supp. 11998).
62 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 3, at 25.
63 29 U.S.C. § 666(d) (1994 & Supp. 11998).
64 See Brennan v. OSHRC, 511 F.2d 1139, 1142 (9d Cir. 1975).
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tion is for a violation of the general duty clause of the Act,5 the Secretary's prima
facie case consists of proof that
(1) the employer failed to render his workplace free of a haz-
ard; (2) the hazard is one recognized by the employer or the
industry of which the employer is a part; (3) the hazard is
likely to cause death or serious physical harm; and (4) the em-
ployer's employees were exposed or had access to the
hazard.
If the citation is for a violation of the special duty clause of the Act,67 the Secre-
tary's prima facie case consists of proof that "(1) a specific standard applies to the
factual situation; (2) there was a failure to comply with the specific standard; and
(3) employees of the cited employer had access to the hazard."'
If and when the Secretary has made a prima facie case of a violation, the
employer may still prevail by establishing an affirmative defense. An employer
must raise all affirmative defenses at the earliest time possible, and all objections
and defenses must be raised no later than the OSHRC hearing before an appointed
ALJ.69 The failure to timely raise an affirmative defense has been deemed a waiver
and precludes the issue from being raised later by the party, by the ALJ, or by
OSHRC upon review.;
The OSHRC affirmative defense doctrine applies to a number of defenses
available to employers involved in a citation proceeding. Affirmative defenses
commonly used include, but are not limited to, greater hazard, infeasibility, and
unpreventable employee misconduct 1
1. Greater Hazard
To establish the greater hazard affirmative defense, the employer must
prove that (1) the hazards caused by complying with the standard are greater than
those encountered by not complying; (2) alternative means of protecting employees
were either used or were not available; and (3) application for a variance under the
Act would be inappropriate3 2 Before an employer elects to ignore the requirements
65 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 11998).
6 Richard P. Shafer, Annotation, Employee Misconduct as Defense to Citation, 59 A.L.R. FED. 395
§ 2(b) (1982 & Supp. 1997).
67 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1 1998).
6 See Shafer, supra note 66, § 2(b).
69 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1994 & Supp. 1 1998).
70 See id
71 See Shafer, supra note 66, § 2(b).
72 29 U.S.C § 655(d) (1994 & Supp. 11998).
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of a standard because it believes that compliance creates a greater hazard, the em-
ployer must explore all possible alternatives and is not limited to those methods of
protection listed in the standard.73
2. Infeasibility
In order to prove the defense of infeasibility, a respondent must demon-
strate that (1) literal compliance with the requirements of the standard was infeasi-
ble, under the circumstances, in that (a) its implementation would have been tech-
nologically or economically infeasible, or (b) necessary work operations would
have been technologically or economically infeasible after its implementation, and
(2) either an alternative method of protection was used or no alternative method of
protection was feasible.7 4 When an employer seeks to avoid liability for its non-
compliance with a standard on the ground that compliance is infeasible, it must
show that it explored all possible alternative means of protecting its employees and
that none of them was available, just as it must do to prove the greater hazard af-
firmative defense. 5
3. Employee Misconduct
To prove the unpreventable employee misconduct defense, an employer
must establish that (1) it had established work rules to prevent the violation; (2) the
rules were adequately communicated to employees; (3) it took steps to discover
violations; and (4) it effectively enforced rules when infractions were discovered.76
Regardless of the extensive experience of an employee with respect to an assigned
task, in the absence of any effort to evaluate compliance with pertinent safety rules,
an employee's subsequent misconduct will not be classified as unpreventable.77
OSHRC precedent essentially has extended the unpreventable employee
misconduct defense to supervisors, holding that when the alleged misconduct is
that of a supervisory employee, the employer must establish that it took all feasible
steps to prevent the accident, including adequate instruction and supervision of its
supervisory employee.7 A supervisor's involvement in the misconduct is strong
evidence that the employer's safety program was lax.7 9 Moreover, where a supervi-
73 Secretary of Labor v. State Sheet Metal Co., 16 BNA OSHC 1155, 1159 (No. 90-2894, 1993).
74 Secretary ofLaborv. Gregory& Cook, Inc., 17BNAOSHC 1189, 1190 (No. 92-1891, 1995)
75 State Sheet Metal Co., 16 BNA OSHC at 1161.
76 Secretary of Labor v. Nooter Construction Co., 16 BNA 1572, 1578 (1994).
77 Secretary of Labor v. American Sterilizer Co., No. 91-2494, 1997 WL 694094 (Nov. 5, 1997).
78 Secretary of Labor v. L.E. Meyers Co, 16 BNA OSHC 1037 (No. 90-945, 1993); Secretary of
Labor v. Daniel Construction Company, 10 BNA OSHC 1549 (No. 16265, 1982).
79 L.E. Meyers Co, 16 BNA OSHC 1037; Daniel Construction Company, 10 BNA OSHC 1549.
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sory employee is involved, the proof of unpreventable employee misconduct is
more rigorous and the defense is more difficult to establish since it is considered
the supervisor's duty to protect the safety of employees under his supervision.'
III. TREATMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT DEFENSE BY THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE COURTS
Unpreventable employee misconduct is one of the most frequently litigated
defenses to OSHA citations. The purpose of the defense is to establish that the em-
ployer did not know, and could not have known, of the violation, for he had done
everything reasonably possible to prevent it. Currently, a split of authority exists
among circuits regarding the issue of who has the burden of proof in OSHA en-
forcement proceedings.
A. Majority
When there is a violation of the general duty clause and an employer as-
serts the defense of unpreventable employee misconduct, the burden of proof is on
the Secretary of Labor.81 Because of the broad scope of the general duty clause, the
Secretary has broad discretion in selecting defendants and in proposing penalties.82
In some circuits, when the Secretary has made out a prima facie case of violation of
the special duty clause, an employer may assert the affirmative defense of unpre-
ventable or unforeseeable employee misconduct.' The unpreventable or unforesee-
able employee misconduct affirmative defense to an alleged violation of the special
duty clause requires an employer to demonstrate that it (1) established a work rule
to prevent violative behavior; (2) adequately communicated the rule to its employ-
ees; (3) took steps to discover noncompliance; and (4) effectively enforced safety
rules when violations were discovered. 84 Another group of federal circuits place the
burden on the employer to establish a defense that it has established and enforced
adequate safety rules, without imposing a prima facie burden on the Secretary other
than showing that a violation occurred.'
so L.E. Meyers Co, 16 BNA OSHC 1037; Daniel Construction Company, 10 BNA OSHC 1549.
81 See National Realty and Construction Co., Inc. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
82 See id. at 1263.
8 See D.A. Collins Construction Co., Inc., v. Secretary of Labor, 117 F.3d 691, 695 (2d Cir. 1997);
Daniel International Corp. v. OSHRC, 683 F.2d 361,363 (1 11h Cir.1982).
8 See Brock v. L.E. Myers Co., High.Voltage Div., 818 F.2d 1270, 1277 (6" Cir.1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 989 (1987); Danco Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 586 F.2d 1243, 1246 (81 Cir.1978).
85 See H.B. Zachry Co. v. OSHRC, 638 F.2d 812, 818-19 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981); General
Dynamics Corp. v. OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453,458 (lst Cir. 1979).
1998]
11
Garrison: Confusion Reigns Supreme: The United States Supreme Court's Refus
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
B. Minority
The Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits require the Secretary to establish, as
part of his prima facie case, that the violation was not the result of unforeseeable
employee misconduct.86 In Ocean Electric Corp. v. Secretary of Labor,87 the Fourth
Circuit held that the Secretary has the burden to show an employee's act was not
idiosyncratic and unforeseeable, rejecting the Commission's position that unpre-
ventability is an affirmative defense to be established by the employer.88 In cases
where the Secretary proves that a company supervisor had knowledge of, or par-
ticipated in, conduct violating the Act, the Secretary may not impose upon the em-
ployer the risk of non-persuasion in a case where the inference of employer knowl-
edge is raised only by proof of a supervisor's misconduct.89 The participation of an
employer's supervisory personnel may be evidence that an employer could have
foreseen and prevented a violation through the exercise of reasonable diligence, but
it will not end the inquiry into foreseeability. The Third and Tenth Circuits have
held that the Secretary must disprove "unpreventable conduct" in the special situa-
tion where the alleged violative conduct is that of a supervisor.'o When the general
rule that a supervisor's knowledge is imputed to the employer is applied, it is easier
for the Secretary to prove the knowledge requirement. These decisions are based
upon the idea that it is unfair to require that the employer prove unforeseeability
under such circumstances.91
In Capital Electric Line Builders of Kansas, Inc. v. Marshall,9 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Secretary must shoulder the burden of prov-
ing that a violation of OSHA clearance regulations by electric line workers was
preventable, even though a supervisor had participated in the violation.93 The bur-
den could be discharged "by showing that the violation was foreseeable because of
inadequacies in safety precautions, training of employees, or supervision." 9
86 See Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. OSHRC, 737 F.2d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 1984); Capital Elec.
Line Builders of Kansas, Inc. v. Marshall, 678 F.2d 128, 130 (10th Cir. 1982); Ocean Elec. Corp. v. Secretary
of Labor, 594 F.2d 396, 401 (4th Cir. 1979).
87 594 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1979).
88 See id. at 401-02. But cf. Forging Indus. Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 773 F.2d 1436, 1450 (4th
Cir. 1985) (referring to "unforeseeable employee misconduct" as a "defense" available to the employer
under the Act).
89 See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. OSHRC, 623 F.2d 155, 158 (10th Cir. 1980); see also
Ocean Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d at 401.
90 See Pennsylvania Power, 737 F.2d at 358; Mountain States, 623 F.2d at 158.
91 See Pennsylvania Power, 737 F.2d at 357-58; Mountain States, 623 F.2d at 158.
92 678 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1982).
See id. at 129.
94 Id. at 130.
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Again, in Ocean Electric Corp. v. Secretary of Labor,95 the Fourth Circuit
also held that the Secretary of Labor had the burden of proof to show foreseeability
and preventability.9e In a proceeding to review a determination that the petitioner
had committed a serious violation of an OSHA regulation by failing to provide a
barricade or barrier between its employees and energized electric bus-bars and
where it was stipulated between parties that the petitioner's foreman accidentally
left a door in front of the bus-bars open purely due to human error, the court found
that the Secretary failed to show that the foreman's action was reasonably foresee-
able and not an isolated incident of unforeseeable or idiosyncratic behavior.97
C. L.R Willson and Sons, Inc. v. OSHRC9 '
L.R. Willson and Sons, Inc. (Willson), contested a citation issued by the
Secretary on May 12, 1994.99 The citation resulted from an inspection conducted by
OSHA compliance officer Ron Anderson on April 29, 1994.1o The citation alleged
that Willson committed a willful violation of 29 C.F.R. section
1926.750(b)(1)(ii),0 1 or, in the alternative, of 29 C.F.R. section 1926.105(a),102 by
failing to require two of its employees to use fall protection while they were work-
ing approximately 80 feet above the ground. 3 OSHRC affirmed the citation by the
Secretary and Willson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
95 594 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1979).
96 See i d at 403.
97 See id
98 134 F.3d 1235 (4th Cir. 1998).
99 See L.R. Willson and Sons, Inc., O.S.H.R.C. No. 94-1546, 1995 WL 389291, at * 1 (July 3, 1995).
100 See id.
101 This regulation states, in pertinent part: "On buildings or structures not adaptable to temporary
floors, and where scaffolds are not used, safety nets shall be installed and maintained whenever the potential
fall distance exceeds two stories or 25 feet." 29 C.F.R. § 1926.750(b)(1)(ii) (1998).
102 This regulation states: "Safety nets shall be provided when workplaces are more than 25 feet
above the ground or water surface, or other surfaces where the use of ladders, scaffolds, catch platforms,
temporary floors, safety lines, or safety belts is impractical." 29 C.F.R. § 1926.105(a) (1998). The applicabil-
ity of section 1926.750 and section 1926.105(a) to fall hazards during steel erection has been extensively
litigated before the Commission and the courts of appeals. The position taken by the Commission, which is in
line with that of the courts of appeals in four different circuits, is that section 1926.750 applies to falls to the
interior of a structure during steel erection, and that section 1926.105(a) applies to falls to the exterior of a
structure during steel erection. See Brock v. Williams Enter. of Ga., 832 F.2d 567, 569 (1 1th Cir. 1987);
Brock v. L.R. Willson and Sons, Inc., 773 F.2d 1377, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Donovan v. Adams Steel Erec-
tion, Inc., 766 F.2d 804, 806 (3d Cir. 1985); Donovan v. Daniel Marr & Son Co., 763 F.2d 477, 483 (1st Cir.
1985).
103 See Willson, 1995 WL 389291, at *1.
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Fourth Circuit. 1 4 The Fourth Circuit held that OSHRC incorrectly placed the bur-
den upon Willson of showing that the employees' conduct was unforeseeable or
unpreventable.105
1. Procedural History and Background
Willson operates a steel erection business which is headquartered in Gam-
brills, Maryland.Yo8 In 1994, Willson was working as a subcontractor on the reno-
vation of the Orange County Civic Center ("the Center") in Orlando, Florida.107
The project covered approximately 3,000,000 square feet, and constituted one of
the largest such projects in the Southeast. 08 The general contractor on the project
was C.R.S.S./Kelsey/Hardin (" CKH").109 CKH had contracted with Addison Steel,
who acted as the steel fabricator and supplier on the project.110 Addison Steel sub-
contracted the steel erection work to Willson.111
In February 1994, Ron Anderson ("Anderson"), in response to a com-
plaint, conducted a comprehensive inspection of the Center. 12 As a result of the
inspection, Willson was cited for, among other things, violating section
1926.750(b)(2)(i). 13 Anderson had observed a Willson ironworker working ap-
proximately thirty feet above the ground without using fall protection."1 4 During an
informal conference regarding the citation, Willson produced three written warn-
ings that it had issued to employees as evidence that Willson previously disciplined
employees for safety infractions. 5 This documentation convinced the Secretary
that the fall protection violation was the result of unpreventable employee miscon-
104 See L.R. Willson and Sons, Inc. v. OSHRC, 134 F.3d 1235 (4th Cir. 1998).
105 See id. at 1240-41.
106 See Willson, 1995 WL 389291, at *1.
107 See id.
108 See id.
109 See id.
110 See id.
ill See Willson, 1995 WL 389291, at *1.
112 See id.
113 See id. The regulation states in part that "[w]here skeleton steel erection is being done, a tightly
planked and substantial floor shall be maintained within two stories or 30 feet, whichever is less, below and
directly under that portion of each tier of beams on which any work is being performed." 29 C.F.R. §
1926.750(b)(2)(i) (1998).
114 See Willson, 1995 WL 389291, at *1.
115 See id.
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duct.116 Within the terms of an overall settlement, the Secretary withdrew the item
alleging the section 1926.750(b)(2)(i) violation. 17
On April 29, 1994, Joseph A. Dear ("Dear"), then Assistant Secretary of
Labor for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, was staying at a
hotel across the street from the Civic Center.118 From his hotel room, Dear observed
individuals working without fall protection at a height of approximately eighty
feet.119 A call was placed to the local OSHA compliance officer and a compliance
officer was sent to investigate the situation.12°
Before going to the worksite, the compliance officer went to the hotel,
where he obtained permission to go to the hotel's roof accompanied by a hotel se-
curity officer.12' For approximately fifty minutes, using a video camera with a
16-power zoom lens, the compliance officer videotaped two individuals without
fall protection working on structural steel beams approximately eighty feet above
the ground.122 When he finished videotaping the employees, the compliance officer
went to the worksite, where he presented his credentials to representatives of the
general contractor and the steel erection prime contractor, who then gathered repre-
sentatives of Willson and the other steel erection subcontractor. 123 Eventually it was
determined that the two individuals the compliance officer had videotaped were
Willson employees and that one of them was a foreman.124 When the employees
were called to the meeting, they admitted that they were working without fall pro-
tection despite Willson's policy of tying off at all times at elevations above ten
feet. 25 Based upon the compliance officer's observations and the employees' ad-
missions, OSHA cited Willson for a willful violation of fall protection standards. 26
Based on the videotape, the compliance officer's testimony, and the testimony prof-
fered by other witnesses, the ALJ found a serious but not willful violation.127
Willson asserted the affirmative defense that any violation it committed
116 See id.
117 See id.
118 See id
M19 See Willson, 1995 WL 389291, at *I.
120 See id.
121 See id
122 See id at * 1-2.
123 See Willson, 134 F.3d at 1237.
124 See id
125 See Willson, 1995 WL 389291, at *2.
126 See Willson, 134 F.3d at 1237.
127 See Willson, 1995 WL 389291, at *8.
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was the result of unpreventable employee misconduct.128 According to OSHRC, in
order to prove the affirmative defense of unpreventable employee misconduct, an
employer must prove that (1) it had established work rules designed to prevent the
violation; (2) the work rules had been adequately communicated to its employees;
and (3) it had taken steps to discover violations, and had effectively enforced the
rules when violations had been discovered. 29
The only element of the defense that the Secretary disputed was whether
Willson effectively enforced its work rule.13' Willson asserted that it had an excel-
lent safety program that focused on the use of fall protection. 31 Because the con-
tract required that ninety percent of its employees on the job be hired locally, Will-
son had to use ironworkers who had not previously undergone its general training
program, so it sent its newly-hired employees to a school in the area that was con-
ducted by the Associated Builders and Contractors. 132 Willson also put its new em-
ployees through the general contractor's safety training program and its own safety
training.133 In addition, Willson's insurance carrier conducted safety training for its
employees on the site and outside safety consultants were brought in to instruct the
employees.' 34 Willson also held safety meetings at least once a week, and the use of
fall protection was always stressed.'3
In its defense, Willson asserted that it had a disciplinary program by which
employees were reprimanded for safety infractions. 13 Willson hired a safety con-
sultant periodically to inspect its worksite to ensure compliance with safety stan-
dards.137 Willson had issued at least three written reprimands to employees for not
using proper fall protection, and it had fired employees for safety violations.' 38
The testimony of Willson's foreman, however, weakened Willson's argu-
ment regarding the enforcement of its safety rules. 139 When asked if he expected to
128 See id. at *6.
129 See id. at *6 (citing Secretary of Labor v. Falcon Steel Co., 16 BNA OSHC 1179, 1193 (No.
89-3444, 1993)).
See id.
131 See L.R. Willson and Sons, Inc., O.S.H.R.C. No. 94-1546, 1997 WL 111084, at *6 (Mar. 11,
1997).
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 See id.
136 See Willson, 1997 WL 111084, at *7.
137 See Willson, 1995 WL 389291, at *6.
138 See Willson, 1997 WL 111084, at *7.
139 See Willson, 1995 WL 389291, at *6.
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be disciplined by Willson for failing to tie off, Manley responded that he expected
to be disciplined only if an OSHA compliance officer was on the site.140 OSHRC
concluded that the foreman's admission provided insight into Willson's attitude
towards enforcement.141 OSHRC held that Willson failed to establish that its work
rules were effectively enforced and Willson's unpreventable employee misconduct
defense failed.142 OSHRC agreed with the ALJ that the violation was serious and
assessed a penalty of $7,000,143 the maximum permissible for a serious violation
under the Act.144
2. The Fourth Circuit's Decision
On appeal, Willson argued that OSHRC incorrectly placed upon Willson
the burden of showing that the conduct of employees Manley and McVay was un-
foreseeable or unpreventable. 4 Specifically, Willson disagreed with OSHRC's
conclusion that, because a "supervisory employee" committed the violations in
question, the knowledge of those violations should be imputed to Willson, and that
Willson must "establish that it made good faith efforts to comply with the fall pro-
tection standards." 146
The court also disagreed with OSHRC's decision and relied upon Ocean
Electric Corp. v. Secretary of Labor147 for support."6 In Ocean Electric Corp., the
court held that despite a finding of knowledge of the violation on the part of a su-
pervisory employee, the Secretary, not the employer, bore the burden of proving
that the supervisory employee's acts were not unforeseeable or unpreventable.1
41
The court determined that OSHRC ignored precedent, and incorrectly placed the
burden of showing "good faith efforts to comply with the fall protection standards"
upon Willson.an The court found that shifting the burden of proof was inconsistent
140 See id
141 See id.
142 See id.
143 See id. at *8.
144 See 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1994 & Supp. 11998).
14 See Willson, 134 F.3d 1235, 1240.
146 See id. (quoting Willson, 1995 WL 389291).
147 594 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1979).
148 See Willson, 134 F.3d at 1240.
149 See Ocean Elec., 594 F.2d at 40t.
ISO See Willson, 134 F.3d at 1240. "Significantly, the improper burden-shifting complained of in
Ocean Electric consisted of the Commission's requirement of a 'showing by the employer that the supervi-
sory employee with knowledge of the violation was himself adequately supervised with regard to safety
matters."' Id at 1240 n.27 (quoting Ocean Elec., 594 F.2d at 401 (citations omitted)).
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with the court's decision in Ocean Electric.151 Thus the court reversed OSHRC's
decision. 52
In Willson, the ALJ found the prima facie case of a violation because of
Manley's status, and placed upon Willson the burden of rebutting with the "af-
firmative defense" of employee misconduct, and OSHRC affirmed.153 The court
stated that although some circuits have held that unpreventable employee miscon-
duct "is an affirmative defense that an employer must plead and prove,"'4 the
Fourth Circuit, as well as other circuits,"5 agree that misconduct must be disproved
by the Secretary in his case-in-chief.'58 The court found Ocean Electric's reasoning
to be consistent with the clear intent of Congress.'57 Thus, the Fourth Circuit reaf-
firmed its position in Ocean Electric, and held that OSHRC's burden-shifting was
erroneous.
15
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF L.R. WILLSON AND SONS
The OSHA statutory framework places an employer in an untenable posi-
tion when confronted with employee misconduct. Although the Act imposes a duty
upon employers to obey OSHA rules and regulations, it does not address employee
noncompliance. Moreover, if an employee contributes to any unsafe working con-
dition, the employer inevitably faces potential liability. When an employee is guilty
of violating the Act on the employer's behalf, however, an employer may be able to
raise an employee misconduct defense if he can prove that he has taken steps to
enforce the safety rule in the past.1 59 The Secretary will most likely argue that while
the employer may have taken steps in the past to enforce the rule, this instance
shows that enforcement efforts have been ineffective. Conversely, the employee
will suffer no repercussion for the misconduct, except perhaps a subpoena to testify
151 See id.
152 See id.
153 See Willson, 1995 WL 389291, at *6.
154 See Willson, 134 F.3d 1235, 1240 & n.29 (citing New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Secretary
of Labor, 88 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that unforeseeability and unpreventability are affirmative
defenses and citing authority from the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits in support of this
proposition)).
155 But see cases cited supra note 78.
156 See Pennsylvania Power, 737 F.2d 350, 358; Capital Elec., 678 F.2d 128, 129; Mountain States,
623 F.2d 155, 158; Ocean Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 396, 401.
157 See Willson, 134 F.3d at 1241 n.31 (citing Ocean Elec., 594 F.2d at 399 (Congress clearly did not
intend employer to be insurer of employee safety: Rather, employers are to promote such safety "as far as
possible" (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994)))).
158 See id. at 1241.
Nooter Construction Co., 16 BNA at 1578.
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against the employer's company.
The affirmative defense of employee misconduct does not appear to offer
an employer a great deal of protection. In a majority of circuits, where the burden is
on the employer to prove unpreventable employee misconduct, an employer can
successfully establish the first three elements of the defense, but fails in proving the
fourth element, that the employer's rules where effectively enforced, if infractions
are discovered. The reason employers find it difficult to prove the fourth element is
because many managers only impose oral warnings as a means of discipline. Also,
where a workplace is unionized, concern over litigation may discourage managers
from imposing discipline, especially formal written disciplinary action. Most im-
portantly, employers are currently moving towards a behavior-based approach to
safety which relies upon positive reinforcement methods to improve safety compli-
ance.
160
The case of L.R. Willson and Sons, Inc. v. OSHRC,1 61 provides employers
in the Fourth Circuit with more protection from an OSHA citation. The court's
rejection of OSHA's position that an employer must prove employee misconduct as
an affirmative defense has shifted the burden of proof to the Secretary. Therefore, if
an employee's misconduct has resulted in an OSHA citation, it may now be less
difficult for an employer to defeat a citation. Perhaps, this decision will encourage
OSHA to consider a plan that places some responsibility upon employees to com-
ply with the Act.
The employee misconduct defense is still one of the most litigated de-
fenses to an OSHA citation.162 In L.R Willson and Sons, the Secretary petitioned
the Supreme Court to review the issue, but certiorari was denied leaving a split
among the circuits.16 A spokesman for OSHA stated that the case is one of only a
handful that the Secretary has appealed to the Court since the creation of the Act. 64
In 1987, the Supreme Court was confronted with the same issue in L. E. Myers
Company, High Voltage Division v. Secretary of Labor.165 Although the Court de-
nied certiorari, Justice White issued a dissenting opinion joined by Justice
O'Connor.16 Justice White asserted that the holding in L. E. Myers, "reinforced the
already confusing patchwork of conflicting approaches to this [employee miscon-
160 See, e.g., Carl Graf Hoyos, Occupational Safety: Progress in Understanding the Basic Aspects of
Safe and Unsafe Behavior, 44 APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 233-250 (1995).
161 134 F.3d 1235 (4th Cir. 1998).
162 Employee Misconduct, supra note 6.
163 See Willson, 119 S. Ct. 404.
164 Employee Misconduct, supra note 6.
165 818 F.2d 1270 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 989 (1987).
166 See L.E. Myers Co., High Voltage Div. v. Secretary of Labor, 484 U.S. 989 (1987).
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duct] issue." 167 He concluded his dissent by acknowledging that certiorari should
have been granted because the conflict among the Circuits "shows no signs of
abating and the issue is central to OSHA's enforcement efforts."1 6
V. CONCLUSION
When an employee violates an employer's safety rule that is designed to
enforce a government requirement, the employer is guilty of violating the law. If
the employer can prove that it has taken steps to enforce the safety rule in the past,
it may be able to raise an employee misconduct defense at a formal hearing. The
Fourth Circuit's ruling in L.R. Willson and Sons created a split in the circuit courts
regarding the issue of the burden of proof when an employer contends that lack of
compliance with a governmental standard was the result of unpreventable em-
ployee misconduct. In the Fourth Circuit, the burden is on the Secretary of Labor to
prove that the employee's misconduct was preventable. Nonetheless, the majority
of circuits have held that the burden is on the employer to demonstrate unprevent-
able employee misconduct.
The United States Supreme Court's failure to address the issue in L.R.
Willson and Sons has only perpetuated the longstanding conflict among the circuits.
For the most part, employers have been placed in an untenable position when con-
fronted with employee misconduct because employees have only rights, not re-
sponsibilities, under the Act. Admittedly, in many instances the employer may be
in the best position to eradicate even those unsafe conditions created by his em-
ployee's misconduct. In numerous other instances, however, employers are help-
less, despite their best efforts, to control employee behavior. As employers know,
there is no disciplinary program that will prevent all employees from violating
rules. Thus, the Fourth Circuit's decision in L.R. Willson and Sons makes it easier
for employers to overcome an OSHA citation. This decision, however, may also be
destructive because it enables employers to blame a safety violation on the miscon-
duct of an employee in order to escape liability. Ultimately, there is need for uni-
formity in the law; therefore, the United States Supreme Court should rule upon a
definitive standard regarding the issue of who has the burden of proof in OSHA
enforcement proceedings.
Heather Malone Garrison*
167 See id. at 990.
168 See id.
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